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This paper examines the optimal operation strategies for income properties.
Specifically, the rental rate and the operating expense should be set at levels
to maximize the return on investment.  The results suggest that for a given
demand curve of a specific rental property, there exist optimal levels of the
income ratio, the operating expense ratio, and the vacancy rate.  With a
Cobb-Douglas demand curve, we derived closed form solutions of these
optimal ratios for a given income property.  The relevant local comparative
statics of these ratios also are derived.  These comparative statics also
provide insight into the optimal building size and optimal rehabilitation
decisions.  An empirical case study was conducted to demonstrate how the
model can be applied in real life situations.
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Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to analyze operating strategies for income
properties.  Two of the most important decisions for managers to make are
the amount of rent and operating expenses that should be charged or be spent
on the rental property.  These issues were rarely studied in the academic2 Colwell, Kung and Yang
literature.  In this paper, we attack this problem by assuming that the
manager's objective is to maximize the net present value (NPV) of the
investment.
Colwell (1991) indicated that, under a given market condition, a higher
vacancy rate might actually be preferable to a lower vacancy rate.  He used a
downward sloping curve between occupancy rate and gross rental rate to
illustrate that, within a relevant range, per-unit rent must fall if occupancy is
to rise.  A completely occupied building may not provide the maximum
possible net operating income (NOI) to the property owner.  Colwell
concluded that in maximizing value, achieving a precise balance in income
and expenses might be more important than reaching 100-percent occupancy.
Chinloy and Maribojoc (1998) used a portfolio of apartment buildings in
Portland, Oregon, to test whether managers have flexibility to select
strategies on expense (overhead, repairs, capital expenditures, taxes and
insurance, and marketing)-rent combinations.  They found a positive
correlation between gross rents and expenses.  However, the correlation
coefficients between net rents and expenses are not always positive.  NOI
increases with an increase in the marketing expense, but decreases with an
increase in other expenses.  They contended that optimization at the margin is
not always achieved.  There is scope for increases at the margin in certain
expense categories and reduction in others, though partly mitigated by the
lumpiness of investments.
In the next section, we introduce the profit maximization decisions faced by
an investor.  Algebraic properties of the optimal operating ratios are also
introduced.  In Section 3, we use a Cobb-Douglas demand curve to
demonstrate the maximization solution more precisely.  Comparative statics
of the closed-form solutions of the optimal strategies are derived in Section 4.
From these comparatives, implications regarding the optimal building size
and optimal rehabilitation strategy are also discussed.  An empirical analysis
is conducted and summarized in Section 5.  The corresponding optimal
operating ratios and their sensitivities confirm with the algebraic solutions.
The last section provides conclusions and possible extensions.
The Optimization Framework
Cannaday and Yang (1995, 1996) discussed real estate investor's optimal
financial decisions (i.e. the optimal interest rate-discount points combination
and the optimal leverage ratio strategies) of income-producing properties.
Both studies focus on income-producing properties, and are based on a
discounted cash flow approach.  In this paper, we adopt the identicalOptimal Property Management Strategies 3
approach.  Instead of analyzing the financing decisions, we focus on the
investment decisions.  Specifically, we study the optimal operating strategy in
terms of setting the levels of rent and operating expenses.
As in most other investment situations, a typical equity investor in the rental
market tries to maximize the NPV from investment over a given investment
horizon.  For income producing properties, the income consists of the after
tax cash flows (ATCF) and the after tax equity reversion (ATER), while the
initial investment outlay consists of the price of the real estate and the
associated transaction costs incurred in acquiring the property.  The ATCF is
the rental income less such associated expenses as expenses for operation and
maintenance, mortgage debt service, and income taxes.  The ATER is the
future sales price less such associated expenses as transaction costs, mortgage
repayment, and capital gains taxes.
To simplify the problem, we ignore tax effects and focus on the pre-tax NPV.
Without capital gains taxes, the ATER would be equivalent to the before tax
equity reversion (BTER).  Meanwhile, without income taxes, the ATCF
would be the same as the before tax cash flow (BTCF).
Without losing generality, we assume that the property is 100% equity
financed
1. When there are no mortgage expenses, the BTCF is the same as
the  NOI, which is defined as the effective gross income (EGI) less the
operating expenses (OE).  The EGI is the potential gross income (PGI) minus
the vacancy and collection losses.  If we further assume that the rent is the
only revenue generated by the property, then the PGI can be computed as the
per unit rent (Rt) multiplied by the number of available rental units (Qs) - that
is, the quantity of rental space within a particular property.
The measuring unit for rental space can be dwelling units for residential
properties or square feet for non-residential properties.  When there are no
collection losses, the EGI is equal to R Qd, where R is the rent (price) per
unit of rental space and Qd is the quantity of rental space demanded by
potential renters.  Let C = 
s Q
OE be the per unit operating expenses, or the cost
incurred by the investor for each unit of available rental space.  For a given
physical property, higher C usually leads to higher quality, and is more
attractive to potential renters.
                                                
1 Modigliani and Miller demonstrated through their "proposition I" that in a perfect market, the
capital structure is irrelevant to the value of a firm.4 Colwell, Kung and Yang
Collectively, the NOI can be written as R Qd - C Qs.  However, Q
d, the
quantity demanded, is subject to the physical constraint of Q
s, the physical
space available for lease.  If Qd is smaller than Qs, Qd is occupied and the
vacancy rate is 
s
d s
Q
Q Q − .  On the other hand, if Qd is greater than Qs, only
Qs space can be leased due to the physical constraint and the vacancy rate
being zero.  Therefore, the profit maximization problem is subject to the
constraint: Qd ≤  Qs.
An investor's objective is to maximize the net present value (NPV).
Following the above simplifications, the NPV for an income property is the
present value of the cash flows plus the present value of the equity reversion
minus the initial investment.
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s.t. Qdt ≤  Qst,
where i is the investor's required rate of return or cost of capital, which is
determined exogenously, T is the expected number of periods before the
property is re-sold, and P0 is the price (cost) initially paid for the property.
In the short run, the supply curve is a vertical line or perfectly inelastic.  On
the other hand, the demand for rental space depends on the rent and the
operating expenses, Qdt[ Rt,Ct ].  On a regular price-quantity plane as shown
in Figure 1, the change in operating expenses corresponds to a shift in the
demand curve, while the change in rent corresponds to a move along the
demand curve.  Given a specific physical property, the quality of the housing
services of each physical rental unit (apartment or house) increases with the
discretional expenses landlords spend to maintain the property and provide
extra amenities.  Thus, holding rent constant, higher amenities usually lead to
higher demand.  As a result, the demand curve shifts out with the operating
expenses.  This is illustrated in Figure 1, when OE increases, and the demand
curve shifts out from the solid curve to the dashed curve.  On the other hand,
holding operating expenses or the quality of a property constant, if rent level
was very high, one would expect that decreasing the rent marginally would
attract higher demand.  This represents a move along the demand curve in
Figure 1.Optimal Property Management Strategies 5
Figure 1 The Demand Curve of a Rental Property
These behaviors lead to the following properties of the demand curve with
respect to R and C:
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Assuming that the demand function is independent of time, all the time
subscript in the demand function can be dropped from Equation (1).
Furthermore, assuming that the real estate transaction market is
informationally efficient, real property must be sold at a price equal to the
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Quantity6 Colwell, Kung and Yang
maximum present value of the future NOI's
2.  According to Gordon's rule, the
value of an investment is the future potential income discounted by the
investor's required return.  Every investor who is interested in purchasing the
property will operate the property so as to maximize his NPV from the
investment.  When the market is informationally efficient, the winner of the
bid for the property at time T must pay a price equal to the maximized
present value of the NOI he is able to obtain from the property.  Thus, the
future sales price, PT, should be the maximized present value of the NOI
discounted by the cost of capital, i.
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s.t. Qd ≤  Qs.
Substituting Equation (3) into equation (1), the objective function becomes:
MaxR,C  ∑
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s.t.  Qd ≤  Qs.
Because P0 is a fixed amount of sunk cost and i is exogenously determined
by the investor’s cost of capital, they are irrelevant to the maximization
problem of Equation (4).  Solving Equation (4) is equivalent to solving
Equation (5):
MaxR,C  R Qd - C Qs                                                                            (5)
s.t.  Qd - Qs ≤  0.
Note that Equation (5) is nothing more than the maximization of a single
period's NOI.  Under the assumption of a time-independent demand curve,
the multiple period model collapses into a single period condition.  Investors
would act as if they were myopic.
                                                
2 Evans (1991) discussed the meaning of market value and whether market or investment value
represents "real" value.  In a soft real estate market, there are not many owners willing to sell at
these lower prices, so in effect, there are not two parties to the assumed transactions.  As a
result, one has liquidation values being presented by appraisers in the guise of market values.
In such a case, the informationally efficient real estate transaction market assumption would no
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Denote the optimal solutions as R
* and C
*, as they can be used in computing
the optimal levels for the ratios commonly used in the real estate leasing
industry.  First, the optimal vacancy rate can be computed as:
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In reality, if the demand for rental space is high enough, this rate can be
brought down to zero.  Figure 1 shows that having a zero vacancy rate may or
may not be the optimal strategy.  Suppose the unconstrained optimal quantity
to be leased is Qd* with R
*.  If the supply is smaller than this Qd*, such as
s Q1  in Figure 1, the constraint is binding.  The manager can increase the rent
to R1 and still maintain a zero vacancy rate; yielding a higher NOI.  On the
other hand, if supply were greater than Qd*, such as  s Q2  in Figure 1, then the
optimal vacancy rate would be greater than zero, but the profitability also
decreases.  This is consistent with Colwell’s (1991) finding.  Of course, by
lowering the rent to R2, the manager could bring the vacancy rate down to
zero.
Two other popular operating ratios referred to in the industry are the Income
Ratio (IR) and the Operating Expense Ratio (OER).  Their optimal levels
under this framework are:
IR* = 
*
*
PGI
NOI = 
s
s d
Q R
Q C C R Q R
*
* * * * ] , [ − , and                                 (7)
OER* = 
*
*
EGI
OE = 
] , [ * * *
*
C R Q R
Q C
d
s
.                                                              (8)
Again, whether the result of Equation (8) is consistent with the rule of thumb
is hard to determine.  The example provided in the next section suggests that
the rule of thumb fails to provide a unique operating strategy.
A Specific Solution
A Cobb-Douglas demand function is used to give a more precise sense of
how the above optimal strategies work.  The specific form of the demand
curve we choose is:8 Colwell, Kung and Yang
Qd = 
δ
β
α
C
R
Q − 0 ,                                                                            (9)
where Q0 is the total potential demand for rental space if no rent is
required,α  is a scalar that measures the effect of operating strategy on the
quantity of rental space demanded,
β  =
d
d
R
Q Q
Q
− 0 ε is a measure of rent elasticity of demand ( R ε  is the rent
elasticity of demand),
δ  = 
d
d
C
Q Q
Q
−
−
0 ε is a measure of operating expense elasticity of demand
( C ε  is the operating expense elasticity of demand), and
δ β α , , , 0 Q  > 0.
This Cobb-Douglas demand curve is a flexible and reasonable functional
form to capture the local behavior of the demand curve.  The local concavity
behavior is applicable to a wide range of demand curves that satisfy the
properties in Equation (2).  In particular, we have:
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Substituting this demand function into Equation (5), we are able to solve for
the optimal level of rent and operating expense, and to obtain insight into the
validity of the rules of thumb.  Because of the existence of the inequality
constraint, the problem can be solved for two conditions: 1) the constraint is
not binding; and 2) the constraint is binding.
Constraint not binding
When the constraint is not binding, the first order necessary conditions for
the optimization problem are:
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Solving the simultaneous Equation (11), the optimal rent and optimal
operating expense are found to be:
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To make sure that this solution is indeed the maximum instead of a minimum
or a saddle point, we double-check the second order conditions.  The three-
second order partial derivatives for the NOI are:
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The first two of these second order partial derivatives carry negative signs,
and thereby guarantee that the solution set is not a minimum.  To ensure that
the solution is not a saddle point, the necessary condition for the solution to
satisfy is :
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This result indicates that  δ β >  is the only additional requirement to ensure
the Equation (12) solution set is the maximum.
Plugging Equation (12) into Equation (9), we find the optimal quantity
demand to be:
Qd* = Q0  
β
β
+ 1
> 0.                                                                          (15)
Recall that the solution set we computed above is for the case in which the
constraint is not binding.  For this solution to be an interior solution, Qd*10 Colwell, Kung and Yang
must be smaller than the quantity supplied.  This is the same as requiring Qs
≥  
β
β
+ 1
Q0.  The optimal NOI the landlord obtains by using the optimal
strategy (R*,C*) is found to be:
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Since  δ β > , the NOI* is always greater than zero.  This result ensures that
the solution set is not dominated by the trivial solution that R = C = 0.
Substituting the solution set into Equations (6), (7), and (8), we find the
operating ratios indicated by the strategy of maximizing the net operating
income:
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These optimal ratios demonstrate several interesting points.  First, V*, the
optimal vacancy rate is always smaller than or equal to 100 percent because
the second term of the first line of Equation (17) is always positive.  On the
other hand, because the physical constraint is not binding, the quantity
demanded must be smaller than Qs.  Therefore, for the solution set to be the
maximum with the constraint not binding, the quantity of space supplied must
be greater than the quantity demanded.  This criterion prevents the second
term in the first line of Equation (17) from being greater than 1.  That is, the
V* is greater than 0.  Otherwise, it belongs to the case where the constraint is
binding.  For a given market condition, a larger building is more likely to
realize an interior solution.  Satisfying this criterion is equivalent to saying
that the optimal vacancy rate is strictly greater than zero.  A zero vacancy
rate fails to provide the maximum possible profit.  By merely increasing the
rent level, the landlord can increase the NOI.  When the operating expense is
adjusted simultaneously, the NOI can be brought to an even higher level.
Second, the income ratio is also between 0 and 1.  The relationship β  > δ ,
which we obtained from Equation (14), guarantees this income ratio to beOptimal Property Management Strategies 11
positive.  Also, since 
) 1 (
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) 1 (
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Qs , the IR* is always less than
1.  Finally, the operating expense ratio is always between 0 and 1.  It is
obvious that this ratio can never be negative, and given that β  > δ , the OER*
is always smaller than 1.
Constraint Binding
If the optimal demand quantity obtained in Equation (15) is greater than the
space available, then the physical constraint becomes binding, and we have
Qd = Qs.  Under such circumstances, the optimal operating expense can be
written as a function of the optimal rent.  That is,
C = 
δ β α
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Substituting Equation (18) into the objective function Equation (5), the
problem is simplified to:
MaxR 
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The optimal solution of this objective function is:
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Both R** and C** are guaranteed to be positive.  If the constraint is binding,
the potential demand, Q0, must be greater than the space supplied.
Substituting Equation (19) into the objective function, we obtained the
optimal NOI
NOI** = (R** - C**) Qs =  () ()
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This NOI** is greater than zero because β  is greater than δ .  Therefore,
Equation (21) guarantees the existence of a non-trivial solution.
Furthermore, since the constraint is binding, increasing the building size
marginally implies an increase in NOI.  The positive signs on the comparative
statics introduced in the next section confirm this result.
Since the constraint is binding, we know that the space demanded, given the
(R**,C**) strategy, equals the space supplied.  That is, the optimal vacancy
rate, V**, is zero.  In other words, when the demand for rental space is high,
or Q0 >> Qs, maximizing NPV can be achieved by minimizing the vacancy
rate.
If the constraint were binding, the quantity demanded would be equal to the
quantity supplied.  This condition simplifies the income ratio to be 
R
C
− 1 and
the operating expense ratio to be 
R
C
.  Substituting Equation (20) into R and
C above, we get:
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A constrained condition can be used to explain markets with rent control.  In
those markets, the rent elasticity is less than one, meaning the landlord can
increase NOI by increase rent.  This additional constraint leads to a zero
vacancy rate.  In order to increase NOI, the operating policy is to lower the
operating expenses to the minimum level.  As a result, the unit of housing
services provided by each rental unit decreases.  The demand curve shifts
down.  Landlords will continue this as long as it does not violate the safety
codes.
To summarize, the objective of maximizing the investor's NPV does provide
a unique optimal operating strategy for the given demand function.  The
physical constraint is likely to be binding when Qs is much smaller than the
total potential demand for space.  The optimal strategy derived in this section
can help property managers achieve the highest return on investments.Optimal Property Management Strategies 13
Comparative statics
In addition to the optimal operating strategy, investors may also be interested
in the impacts of changes in market conditions (i.e. changes in Q0,  Qs,
δ β α   and   ,   , ) on the profit maximization rent/expense combinations across
sub-markets or over time.  These impacts are analyzed by the comparative
statics.  Table 1 presents the signs of all the comparative statics for the NPV
maximizing solution.  Table 1 provides suggestions for adjustments in the
levels of rent and operating expenses that should be undertaken with respect
to the changes in the market parameters.  Given the adjustment in operating
strategy, we can also read the direction of the change in the NOI and
operating ratios from Table 1.  A positive sign indicates that the optimal level
of the variable should increase with an increase in the market parameter.  A
negative sign indicates the reverse condition.  A question mark implies that
the movement in the optimal level of the variable can be either up or down,
depending on the current market condition.
Table 1Results of the comparative statics
1(a) Constraint Not Binding
∂  R* ∂  C* ∂  NOI* ∂  V* ∂  IR* ∂  OER*
∂  Q0+ + +-+0
∂  Qs ---+- 0
∂  α ---00 0
∂  β ??? -+ -
∂  δ ???0 - +
1(b) Constraint Binding
∂  OER** ∂  R** ∂  C** ∂  NOI** ∂  V** ∂  IR**
∂  Q0 0+++00
∂  Qs 0--?00
∂  α 0---00
∂  β -???0+
∂  δ +???0-
* Proofs of these comparative statics are shown in the Appendix.
Some of the comparative statics provide particularly interesting implications.
Specifically, the impacts of the changes in the potential demand (Q0) and the
quantity supplied (or building size, Qs) on the levels of rent and operating
expenses provide information about the adjustment of the manager's
operating strategy.  Meanwhile, the impact of the change in Qs on the optimal14 Colwell, Kung and Yang
NOI provides some insight into the optimal development and rehabilitation
strategies.
First, a change in the quantity supplied has the same impact on the optimal
levels of rent and operating expense regardless of whether the constraint is
binding.  If there is an increase in the quantity of the space available for
lease, then the manager should lower the rent and cut the operating expense
in order to achieve a new optimal NOI.  It may sound strange that the
physical size of the real property can change.  Several conditions could
induce a change in Qs.  One example would be if an existing building were
torn down and replaced by a larger or smaller building.  Another would be
the case in which a new building was acquired by the management team and
as a result, the quantity of total space supply controlled by the same manager
was increased.  Yet another case might be the conversion of owner-occupied
space to renter-occupied space.  In accordance with the change in the amount
of space under control, the manager should adjust his operating strategy to
achieve the new optimal NOI.
Second, an increase in the number of potential renters implies that the
manager should raise the rent and operating expenses regardless of whether
the constraint is binding or not.  In either case, the optimal NOI increases.  It
is important for the manager to determine which condition he is facing in
order to make the best adjustment.
Finally, while a greater Qs implies a lower NOI when the constraint is not
binding, the change in the optimal NOI with respect to the change in Qs when
the constraint is binding is indeterminate.  The negative sign of  
s Q
NOI
∂
∂ *
in
Table 1(a) shows that a smaller building implies a higher NOI.  Since our
demand function does not depend on the Qs, a decrease in Qs decreases total
costs while leaving total revenue unchanged.  As a result, the NOI would be
higher under such a circumstance.  This result suggests that when developing
a new rental building, the investor should make the building as small as
possible.  However, as the building size decreases, it is more likely that the
physical constraint becomes binding.  If the physical constraint holds, we
should focus on the result provided in Table 1(b).  The sign of
s Q
NOI
∂
∂ * *
depends on the amount of space available.  Specifically, the sign is
negative if and only if Qs is greater than 
) ( 1
) ( 0
δ β
δ β
− +
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only if Qs is less than 
) ( 1
) ( 0
δ β
δ β
− +
− Q .  We can denote the critical size as Q*.
This result reveals that the NOI will increase continuously with a decrease in
Qs until size Q* is reached.  When this particular size is reached, any further
decrease in the building size will cause a decrease in the NOI.  Thus, Q*
provides an optimal building size for the given market conditions.  Recall
that the quantity demanded under the optimal strategy when the constraint is
not binding is 
β
β
+ 1
0 Q .  This quantity is greater than Q*.  Therefore, we cannot
derive the optimal building size by simply using Qd(  R*,C* ) as if the
constraint were not binding.  A developer considering building a new income
property in the community should construct a building of this particular size.
Also, when the investor is considering a rehabilitation project, he should try
to adjust the existing building size toward this Q*.  If the increase in the
present value of the NOI is greater than the cost of rehabilitation (by adding,
partially tearing down, or totally rebuilding), then it is recommended that the
investor do so.
The rest of the comparative statics in Table 1 also reveal some information
about the effect of a change in market conditions.  As the results are not
directly applicable in property management, we will not discuss them in
detail.
Empirical Analysis
The properties studied in this paper were apartment facilities in selected
California communities.  They range in size from ten units to complexes of
over five hundred units.  We examined all multi-family residential properties
that were sold in three California counties between January 1993 and
December 1995.  Data about the transactions were obtained from COMPS,
Inc., a subsidiary of the TRW organization.  The transactions were classified
according to their locations within Orange County, San Diego County,
northern Los Angeles County, and western Los Angeles County.  From the
analysis, we excluded transactions with missing information and those
involving properties with fewer than sixteen rental units.  We thus obtained a
working data set containing 467 transactions.
We used the Cobb-Douglas demand curve specified in Equation (9) with
additional residential rental property characteristics controlling for physical
quality deviations and size differences among properties.  These variables16 Colwell, Kung and Yang
include the age of the property (AGE in years), number of parking spaces per
rental unit (PARKING), sales price per unit (U_PRICE), land size per unit
(L_SIZE), total number of units in the property (UNITS), building size per
unit (B_SIZE), and the average number of bedrooms (AVGROOM).  Table 2
shows the summary statistics of variables.
Table 2 Summary Statistics of the Final Sample
Variable N Mean Std Dev Max Min Median
Qd 467 30 33.39 316 8 21
R 467 7042 2084 23232 389 6805
C 467 1359 653.25 4057 44 1334
B_Size 467 769 228.86 1756 118 771
Age 467 23 16.78 94 1 22
Parking 467 1.25 0.59 2.59 0 1.21
Units 467 42 45.99 472 16 28
AVGROOM 467 1.54 0.69 3.8 0 1.55
L_SIZE 467 2120 14053 232143 153 886
U_Price 467 388199 21957 195000 2324 33553
The specific model we estimated takes on the following form:
Qd = – α   δ
β
C
R
 + γ 1 B_SIZE + γ 2 PARKING + γ 3 UNITS + γ 4 U_PRICE + ε .
                                                                                                 (23)
Obviously, this is a non-linear function.  A non-linear regression is applied to
obtain the maximum likelihood estimates (MLE)
3.  Table 3 shows the results
of this non-linear regression with only the significant independent variables.
Except for α , all parameter estimates are significant at the 95 percent level.
When we fixed the  δ β   and   , the model becomes a linear regression, which
has a R
2 equal to 0.95.  With the estimated  δ β ˆ ˆ > , we know that a maximum
NOI exists, and can be calculated by substituting these parameters into
Equation (12).
                                                
3 Different initial values of the parameters were tried to verify this as a global
(vs. a local) solution.Optimal Property Management Strategies 17
Table 3 Final Model Results of the Non-Linear Regression
Independent Variable Coefficient p-Value
α 0.018339 0.2358
β 1.173158 <.0001
δ 0.502723 <.0001
B_SIZE 0.008307 0.0002
PARKING 1.629869 0.0107
UNITS 0.742138 <.0001
U_PRICE 0.000177 <.0001
Summary Statistics
R
2 95%
Number of Observations 467
We used a typical property in the sample to illustrate the implications of
these results.  The typical property has the following characteristics: B_SIZE
= 770, PARKING = 1.25, UNITS = 42, and U_PRICE = $38,900.  Figure 2
illustrates the sensitivity of the NOI with respect to the R and C with the
estimated model.  For a typical rental property in our sample, the optimal
strategy for rent and operating expense per unit are (R
* , C
*) = ($13,515,
$3,461).  That is, the landlord should spend $3,461 to maintain each rental
unit, and the rental price should be $13,515 per unit.  For this solution to be
an interior solution, Qd* must be smaller than the available quantity, 42
units.  The quantity demanded is computed by substituting the estimated
parameters into Equation (9).  This Q
d* turns out to be 25 units, which is
smaller than 42 units, the size of the building.  As a result, the physical
constraint is not binding.  The optimal NOI is found to be $193,831 per
period.  We found the operating ratios indicated by the strategy of
maximizing the net operating income:





=
=
=
%. 85 . 42
%, 15 . 34
%, 25 . 40
*
*
*
OER
and IR
V
We then compared the optimal R*, C*, V*, IR* and OER* with the actual
data on the individual property level.  From Table 4, we found that the actual
operating expenses and the actual rents in most properties were lower than
the optimal solutions suggested by the model.  Landlords could increase the
NOI by increasing the quality of the property by putting in more operating
expenses and simultaneously charging higher rents.  Table 5 shows that the
actual income ratios tend to be too high, and the actual operating expense18 Colwell, Kung and Yang
ratios tend to be too low.  Investors could increase profitability by increasing
operating expenses more relative to the amount of increases in rent.
Figure 2 Net Operating Income of a Typical Apartment in Southern
California
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Table 4 Comparison of R*, C* with R, C – Number of Properties
1.2 C* < C 0.8 C
* < C < 1.2 C
* C < 0.8 C
*
1.2 R
* < R 22 0
0.8 R
* < R < 1.2 R
* 54 0 6 9
R < 0.8 R
* 2 16 331
R and C are the actual rent and operating expenses of the property.  R* an C* are the optimal
rent and operating expenses suggested by the model.
Table 5 Comparison of Operation Ratios – Number of Properties
1.3 X
* < X 0.7 X
* < X < 1.3 X
* X < 0.7 X
*
Vacancy Rate 101 174 192
Income Ratio 315 146 6
Operating
Expense Ratio
9 26 432
X represents the actual vacancy rate, income ratio, or operating expense ratio realized from the
property.  X
* represents the optimal level suggested by the model.Optimal Property Management Strategies 19
One should notice that the sample represents a recession market.  Southern
California suffered from a prolonged recession in the early 1990’s.  The
vacancy rate during this time period tends to be high.  Finding ways to attract
tenants is a very challenging task.  The data observed in this empirical study
reflects this condition.  However, our model suggests that there is significant
room for most property managers to improve their performance by resetting
their pricing strategies.  Sometimes, higher income ratios and lower operating
expense ratios may not lead to maximum profitability.
Conclusions
In this paper, we showed that if the demand curve is time independent, then
investors in rental properties are expected to behave as if they are myopic.
That is, the strategy that maximizes the net present value of investment is
identical to maximizing a single period's net operating income.
With a given demand curve, one can algebraically derive the operating
strategies in terms of setting the levels of rent and operating expenses.  We
used a Cobb-Douglas demand curve to demonstrate the process and to study
the properties of such optimal strategies.  The impact of changes in market
conditions on NOI over time or across sub-markets care were also revealed
by comparative statics.  These comparative statics also provided insights into
the adjustment that one can make corresponding to the new environment to
be maintained at the optimal position.  These results also implied the ideal
building size under a specific market.  Rehabilitation could be optimal as the
increase in the present value of net operating income exceeds the costs of
adjusting the building size.
Cross-sectional multi-family transaction data from southern California was
used to empirically estimate a Cobb-Douglas demand function.  Based on the
estimated parameters, we found that the actual operating expense and the
actual rent tend to be lower than the optimal levels suggested by the model.
On the other hand, the income ratio tends to be too high and the operating
expense ratio tends to be too low.  This suggests that when setting operating
strategies, property managers should not simply focus on one or two ratios.
Sensitivity of the demand (quantity) associated with the rent (price) and
operating expense (quality) are just as important.
This model can also be used when the demand curve is estimated by time
series data.  With proprietary historical performance data, a property
manager would be able to determine the optimal operating strategy.  This is
particularly valuable to managers of short-term lease properties, such as
hotels.20 Colwell, Kung and Yang
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Appendix: Proof of the Comparative statics
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